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Freedom of expression is the oxygen of democracy (International 
Standards Series, 1999, p. 7). Human dignity is the basis of all 
fundamental rights, which occupies a special place among other 
human rights (Gotsiridze E., 2013, p. 108). Freedom of expression 
as a fundamental human right is recognized in international and 
regional Acts. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of Georgia and includes the right of everyone to freely re-
ceive and disseminate information and the right to to express and 
disseminate his/her opinion.  At the same time, freedom of expres-
sion does not belong to categories of absolute rights. The law pro-
vides legal basis for possible restriction of freedom of expression, 
one of which is a legitimate aim of protecting the rights and dignity 
of others. The purpose of this paper is to examine the general 
legal principles of freedom of expression in Georgia and analysis 
of judicial practices in this area. Of particular importance is the 
conflict between the values between freedom of expression and 
the protection of honor and dignity of others. Specifically, the issue 
is where the boundary between these two fundamental rights.
Legal Basis for Freedom of Expression in Georgia
Constitution, as the act of the supreme legal force establishes the 
system of values where freedom of speech and freedom of ex-
pression are at the special place. In particular, Article 19 of the 
Constitution of Georgia provides the right for  everyone to freedom 
of thought and Article 24 thereofprovides that everyone shall be 
free to receive and disseminate information, to express and dis-
seminate his/her opinion orally, in writing, or otherwise (Constitu-
tion of Georgia, 1995).
Specified constitutional values are reflected in Georgian Law 
on Freedom of Speech and Expression. In addition, Article 2 of 
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this Law states that interpretation of this Law shall be provided in 
accordance with the Constitution of Georgia, international legal obli-
gations undertaken by Georgia, including the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (Parliament of Georgia, 2004).
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers (Article 10 of the European Convention). 
It is notable that freedom of expression is provided by the Consti-
tution of Georgia fully shares the values specified by the European 
Convention and this could be regarded as the evidence of harmoni-
zation with the international values (Zoidze B., 2013, p. 253).
Right to Freedom of Speech and Thought 
“Freedom of speech and opinion is one of the substantial bases of 
democratic society and one of the key conditions for progress of 
democratic society and development of individuals” (Handyside v. 
United Kingdom, 1976) (Korkelia K., Kurdadze I., 2004, p.199).  At 
the same time, freedom of expression is one of the fundamental 
rights providing basis for other rights (Zoidze B., 2013, p. 253). Free-
dom of speech and thought could not be imagined without freedom 
of expression. In addition, “expression” implies both, freedom of ex-
pression of own thoughts and freedom of imparting and receiving of 
information (Korkelia K., Kurdadze I., 2004, p. 200).
Freedom of thought is the right to have one’s own opinion with 
respect of any issue and freedom of speech implies expression of 
these opinions (Gotsiridze E., 2013, pp.158 159). Opinion, as the 
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view and the fact should be differentiated. According to explana-
tion of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, opinion is an individu-
al’s personal, subjective assessment of one or another event, idea, 
fact or person, reasonability, correct or erroneous nature of which 
depends on individual’s personal views. It is not subject to prov-
ing as it is the result of discussion, assessment. The facts are the 
events or circumstances actually occurred and can be wrong or 
right, correct. Hence, the facts shall be always based on the evi-
dences. Consequently, imparting of the facts shall be subject to the 
obligation of evidencing of their rightfulness and validity; while va-
lidity of the opinion cannot be evidenced and hence, the individual 
expressing such opinion shall not be obligated to do so (Decision of 
the Constitutional Court of Georgia No:  2/1/241).
Georgian Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression provides 
following definition of the “opinion”: Opinion – evaluative judgment, 
view, comment, as well as expression of views describing attitude 
to any person, phenomenon or subject in whatsoever form not 
containing the provable or disprovable fact (Parliament of Georgia, 
2004). Both, the opinion and expression thereof are quite widely in-
terpreted and include the right of criticism and expression of protest, 
even where it is “offending, shocking or disturbing”, for the specific 
individual or the society as a whole (Gotsiridze E., 2008, pp. 310-
311). Nevertheless, this is the freedom of expression, wherein the 
opportunities of free development are revealed, based on the right 
of self-determination and establishes universal freedom of behavior 
(Khubua G., 2005, p. 63).
Though, this should not be understood as  absence of limits of 
human behavior, including freedom of expression (Zoidze B., 2013, 
p. 259). The scope of limitation of individual’s rights should be de-
termined on the basis of proportionality (Jorbenadze S., Bakhtadze 
U., Macharadze Z., 2014, p. 61). Individual independently sets the 
scopes of universal freedom of behavior until this does not affect 
the others’ rights, moral laws or constitutional order (Khubua G., 
2005, p. 63).
Both, Constitution of Georgia and European Convention on 
Human Rights contain the similar statements. In particular, Con-
stitution of Georgia, providing freedom of speech and expression, 
simultaneously sets certain restrictions due to the respect to the 
other people’s rights. In particular, Article 19 of the Constitution re-
gards that limitation of freedom of thought is unacceptable, unless 
this infringes others’ rights and Article 24 makes more specific pro-
vision and specifies the bases for restriction and protection of the 
others rights and dignity is among them.
Freedom of the Press
Freedom of expression is equally applicable to the freedom of 
press, including the right of mass media to collect and impart infor-
mation without censorship. Similar to freedom of opinion and infor-
mation, the freedom of the press is the fundamental right of partic-
ular significance for democracy and it is the substantial component 
of democratic order (Kublashvili K., 2005, p. 198).
In this respect, the role of mass media is actually invaluable 
and it responds to the requirement of the society to be informed 
(Alpaidze T., 2008, p. 9). Non-performance of the key function of 
mass media – information dissemination – contradicts to the right of 
the society and individual to receive information about issues inter-
esting for them. This approach results from the practice of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights as well, stating that “Press shall dis-
seminate information and ideas on the issues of public interest, and 
not only press serves to the objective of imparting information and 
ideas but the society has the right to be informed.” (Sunday Times 
(N 1) v. the United Kingdom) (Gotsiridze E., 2008, pp. 278–279).
Though, similar to the other spheres of public life, activities of 
mass media cannot be left without proper regulation. In the context 
of freedom of expression this means that mass media is the means 
of communication, providing, in additionto obligation of public in-
formation, the opportunity of dissemination of information violat-
ing the rights of the other person (Jorbenadze S., Bakhtadze S., 
Bakhtadze U, Macharadze Z., 2014, p. 20).
In this respect, legal regulation is necessary for proper opera-
tion of mass media, as the legal institute, as well as for protection 
of the interests of individuals, society and the state. This should not 
be understood as though the direct intervention into regulation of 
the mass media activities is acceptable. Of course not, legal norms 
should, on one hand, ensure protection of such values as the rights 
of free expression of the opinion, availability of information, political 
debates, criticism, and on the other – it shall not allow unreason-
able infringement of such rights as honor, dignity and business rep-
utation (Alpaidze T., 2008, p. 13).
Therefore, in imparting of information the representatives of 
mass media are subject to particular responsibility. While European 
Court of Human Rights regards that the press has the right to use 
exaggerated and provoking statements, with respect of providing of 
facts, it shall comply with the obligation of delivering of the correct 
and reliable information to the society and this implies re-checking 
of information in advance. Providing of wrong information and mis-
leading of the society from the side of the journalists is regarded by 
the European Court of Human Rights as violation of the obligations 
and responsibilities of the journalists and considered as significant 
precondition for necessity of restricting of the freedom of expres-
sion (Gotsiridze E., 2008, p.301).
Constitutional Court of Georgia shares this approach. According 
to the explanation by the Constitutional Court, freedom of speech 
and thought do not belong to the category of absolute, unlimited 
rights. Execution of the right to speech and expression includes 
obligations and responsibilities, in addition to the rights. These 
obligations and even responsibilities are primarily conditioned by 
the necessity that the views, expressed,   disseminated data as a 
result of realization of the rights shall be correct. Non-compliance 
with this condition opposes freedom of speech to the freedom of 
human honor and dignity (Decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Georgia No:  2/1/241, 2004). Additionally, the journalists shall follow 
the “unbiased and fair reportage method”. This means that the dis-
seminated information shall not be one-sided and biased. opposing 
ideas and views should be provided to the society and the scopes 
of the acceptable criticism shall be complied with (Gotsiridze E., 
2008, pp. 301–304).
Thought vs. Fact
On the other side, freedom of press includes not only dissemination 
of the facts and data, but also sharing of the views and assess-
ments (Kublashvili K., 2005, p. 204). Standards applicable to eval-
uating judgment are different. Due to impossibility of cross-check-
ing or stating whether it is right or wrong, evaluative judgment is 
much wider and is subject to fewer restrictions. This is results from 
the simple postulate that “the opinion is not subject to proving”. At 
the same time, it is very difficult to clearly differentiate between the 
facts and opinions. The opinions are mostly expressed in relation to 
certain specific facts, deal with them and rely upon them (Decision 
of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No: 2/1/241, 2004). There-
fore, it is excluded to argue apparently false facts but expressing 
and arguing of the rumors or facts where it is not clear, whether they 
are true or false are not excluded (Zoidze B., 2013, p. 259).
Moreover, Georgian Law on Freedom of Speech and Expres-
sion directly states that “In considering the issue of granting the 
status of a thought or fact, any reasonable doubt, which cannot 
be confirmed under the procedure established by the law, shall be 
resolved in favor of granting the piece of information contained in 
the statement the status of a thought.” (Section 5, Article 7). In addi-
tion, the opinion is protected by the absolute privilege, implying that 
expression of the opinion is not subject to civil law responsibility 
(Parliament of Georgia, 2004). The same approach is accepted by 
the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. Where it is 
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unclear, whether the matter  states of facts or evaluative judgment, 
the Court tends to seek the relevant arguments for qualifying the 
disputed statement as the “evaluative judgment” and thus protect 
the freedom of expression (Gotsiridze E., 2008, p. 332).
Numerous decisions by the Supreme Court of Georgia provide 
discussion of the bases for distinguishing between the opinions and 
facts, setting the uniform approach to this issue. The most recent 
practice of the Court shows both, significance of the issue and ne-
cessity of its interpretation and regulation. In its decisions the Court 
provides quite wide discussion of the problems of distinguishing 
between the opinions , facts and provides the following definitions:
Term “opinion”, in its wide sense, means judgment, attitude or 
evaluation, true or false nature whereof fully depends on the indi-
vidual, his/her subjective attitude. While the facts, normally, lack 
subjective attitude, they come from the objective circumstances, 
i.e. we can cross-check the facts, find out, whether they have ac-
tually occurred or not. Therefore, cross-checking of the facts and 
establishing whether they are true is possible. In many cases the 
opinions and facts are closely linked and it is difficult to differenti-
ate them. This is because forms of expression rarely contain only 
one of them. Mostly the expressions contain both, evaluative and 
factual elements. The opinions often rely upon and deal with the 
facts and the facts, on their side, provide basis for the opinions 
accepting or rejecting them. Therefore, in qualifying the disputed 
statement either as a fact, or as an opinion, regarding the state-
ment context, its parts can be isolated but this method is reason-
able only where this does not cause loss or falsifying of the con-
tent of statement and its true sense. If such isolation is impossible 
without falsifying the statement contents, such statement should 
be regarded entirely as an opinion, or view, evaluative judgment 
and hence, shall be included fully into the sphere protected by the 
fundamental right.
The Court specifies that for adequate qualification of the disput-
ed statement its contents, form of expression and context thereof, 
factual elements composing it shall be examined. One of the key 
signs qualifying the libelous statement is specifying of the facts 
close to reality, more specific and not general, with mostly objective 
contents than subjective and, what is the most important, their ev-
idencing is possible.
For strengthening of its judgment, the Court has also made ref-
erence to the case law decisions by the European Court of Human 
Rights, according to which the opinion (evaluating judgment) can-
not be evidenced by the facts and therefore, no one can be obligat-
ed to evidence true nature of the opinion. Requirement of proving of 
the true nature of evaluative judgment is the attack against freedom 
of thought (Lingens v. Austria) (Decision of 27 May 2015 of the Su-
preme Court of Georgia on case No: as-1304-1242-2014; Decision 
of 30 September 2015 of Supreme Court of Georgia on case No: 
as-1052-1007-2014).
Honor and Dignity as the Sphere Protected by the
Law - Legal Basis
Article 17 of the Constitution of Georgia establishes inviolability of 
individual’s honor and dignity (Constitution of Georgia, 1995). Hu-
man dignity is recognized as the basis of all fundamental human 
rights and is based on recognition of an individual as the main value 
(Gotsiridze E., 2013, p. 107 108). According to the explanation by 
the Constitutional Court of Georgia, inviolability of individual’s hon-
or and dignity guaranteed under Article 17 of the Constitution which 
is belongs to the category of absolute rights and unlike the other 
fundamental rights that does not include provisions on possible re-
striction thereof (Decision No: 2/1/241 of 2004 of the Constitution 
Court of Georgia).
Article 18 of Georgian Civil Code considers the individual’s 
honor, dignity and business reputation in the context of personal 
non-property rights and provides the guarantee of protection of 
these values. On the basis of the specified Article protection of the 
individual’s honor, dignity and business reputation are guaranteed 
through legal action (Section 2, Article 18) and if the information 
defaming individual’s honor, dignity and business reputation isare 
disseminated by mass media, then it must be retracted by the same 
media (Section 3, Article 18) (Civil Code of Georgia, 1997).
Georgian Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression does not 
directly provide any provisions on honor and dignity though the Law 
provides the term “defaming statement” covering honor and dignity. 
On the basis of the above Law, the defaming statement and hence 
information defaming honor and dignity should imply libel and rude-
ness (Jorbenadze S., Bakhtadze U., Macharadze Z., 2014, p. 77). 
According to the terms definition provided by the Law, defamation 
is statement containing a substantially false fact inflicting harm on 
a person; a statement damaging a person’s reputation (Section “e”, 
Article 1) while obscenity is statement which does not have any 
political cultural, educational or scientific value and which rudely vi-
olates the universally recognized ethical norms (Section “f”, Article 
1) (Parliament of Georgia, 2004).
Honor, Dignity and Business Reputation 
There is no generally accepted definition of human dignity. It is 
considered in philosophical, religious, medical and legal contexts 
(Gotsiridze E., 2013, p. 108). According to the definition that is  ac-
cepted in the science “honor” implies objective assessment of the 
individual’s moral and other qualities by the society determining the 
society’s attitude to the individual. And “dignity” implies individual’s 
moral and other qualities, abilities, assessment of his/her duties to 
the society; his/her own social significance by the individual. Busi-
ness reputation implies assessment of the professional and other 
business qualities of an individual by the society providing basis 
for the society’s attitude towards the given individual (Ninidze T., 
2002, pp.60 61).
Human dignity, as a value, is much greater than the right to 
honor, it actually implies protection of the individual’s reputation in 
the society’s view (Gotsiridze E., 2013, p. 114). Honor, dignity and 
business reputation comprise the evaluative category, result of the 
individual’s evaluation where the criteriais the society’s require-
ments. In the process of evaluation in the mind, people deal not 
with the subjects and phenomena but with the information about 
them. Therefore, information about the individual is compared 
against the information about society’s requirements, views formed 
in the society. Reputation is the gained appreciation by the soci-
ety and common views about qualities, strengths and weaknesses 
formed on the basis of available information. Individual’s business 
reputation is the opinion about certain individual’s business quali-
ties, abilities in the sphere of business turnover, this views are also 
formed in the society. For the truth, it does not matter, what the 
individual thinks about himself/herself, how does he/she assesses 
himself/herself, before correspondence of self-assessment with the 
society’s assessment is not determined. This degree of matching is 
subject to protection (Barabadze N., 2011, pp.108-121).
Defaming of the honor and dignity imply dissemination of the in-
formation about an individual containing statements about violation 
of the law or moral norms by a person and disruptive conduct. At 
the same time, such information is not true. Protection of honor and 
dignity is the measure for restriction of freedom of speech and this 
is allowed and ensured by the Constitution (article 19.3) (Decision 
of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No: 2/1/241, 2004).
Conflict of Values
In setting of the scopes of restriction of the freedom of expres-
sion one should clarify the acceptable extent of affecting the oth-
ers’ rights and dignity. For example, in the decision on Handyside 
case the European Court establishes high standards of freedom of 
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expression, according to which the “offending, shocking or disturb-
ing ideas” and “information” may be protected. Democratic society 
relying on the values of pluralism and tolerance, in certain cases, 
obligates the individuals to tolerate ideas and information offending, 
shocking or disturbing for them.” (Zoidze B., 2013, p. 275).
Nevertheless, the standard of freedom of expression provided 
for in the decision on Handyside case should not be understood 
as though Article 10 of the Convention protected freedom of ex-
pression including the right of offending, shocking or disturbing the 
others, as evidenced from the practice of the European Court (Got-
siridze E., 2008, pp. 311–312). The degree of acceptability of the 
offending information should be determined based on the nature 
of offending, as well as the status of its subject in the given society 
(Zoidze B. 2013, p. 275). Presence of special legitimate interests of 
the society should be established and this is done on the basis of so 
called “personal” and “contents” scales. Person’s scale implies the 
society’s legitimate interest where the public figure, a person being 
in the focus of the public attention and his activities are involved, 
while contents’ scale implies the phenomenon to which there is par-
ticular public interest, justifying public discussions and debates and 
in many cases, criticism and arguing unpleasant and flagrant for 
many people (Kublashvili K., 2005, p. 207).
Discussion of freedom of expression in Georgian judicial prac-
tice is of particular interest. According to one of the decisions made 
by the Department of Civil Cases of Tbilisi Court of Appeal, freedom 
of expression, as the means for arranging of the free and open dis-
cussions of the issues of public interest constitutes, simultaneously, 
the most important public interest. This statement is of particular 
significance where the matter is freedom of the press and this is 
natural, as free exchange of the views and open public debates 
about the issues of public interest is provided by means of the 
press and other mass media. Thus, freedom of the press is of high 
value and therefore, its restriction, according to the practice of the 
European Court “requires unusually strong grounding”. According 
to the case law of the European Court, the issues of public inter-
est comprise the most important factor for resolving of the conflict 
of values in favor of the press, certainly, the freedom of the press 
may be restricted as well, if there is significant basis for this. Such 
bases may be different, for example, severity of actual or potential 
damages, negligence to their obligations and responsibilities by the 
journalists etc. In all cases the basis for restriction of the freedom 
of press shall be strong and necessary in the democratic society 
(Case 2b/696–13 of the Tbilisi Appeal Court).
It is notable that in relation with the criticism of the politicians 
the scopes of “acceptable criticism” are much wider while those 
in relation with the private persons are significantly narrower. This 
means that affecting of the private person’s reputation and his/
her rights in their criticism require stronger grounds (Gotsiridze E., 
2008, p. 328).
According to the explanation provided by the Supreme Court 
of Georgia, to sustain the claim related to restriction of freedom 
of speech it is not sufficient to establish the fact of dissemination 
of the libelous statements. Nature of necessity of restriction of the 
freedom of expression is determined by the standards accepted in 
the democratic society. In other words, the restriction must be of 
significant social necessity. In deciding on restriction of freedom 
of expression the problem of balancing of private and public in-
terests emerge. Balance between the freedom of expression and 
rights and reputation of the other persons shall be found taking into 
consideration the characteristics of the specific dispute, though the 
scopes of acceptable criticism; institute of freedom of the press; 
public interests should  be all taken into consideration. In case of 
libelous statements against a private person, the legal composition 
of imposing of responsibility is determined by Article 13 of Geor-
gian Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression. It states that the 
following preconditions shall exist: a) the disseminated information 
shall be about the claimant; b) disseminated information shall con-
tain substantially wrong fact; c) disseminated information shall de-
fame person’s honor, dignity and business reputation (Case No: 
as-1052-1007-2014, Supreme Court of Georgia).
According to the explanation by the Constitutional Court of 
Georgia: “where the protection of someone’s honor and dignity 
is the matter, it would be logical to imply restriction of the others’ 
freedom of speech. This is logical, as in no one of the democratic 
societies the freedom of speech is the absolutely protected right” 
(Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No: 2/1/241, 2004). 
Adequate measure for restitution of the affected honor and dignity 
can be certain compensation of the moral pain caused to the affect-
ed person. In particular, measures ensuring change of the society’s 
opinion about the affected person, formulation of the correct views 
existing before dissemination of the wrong information. And this is 
provided by the right to respond and reject the disseminated infor-
mation.
Also Constitutional Court emphasizes such measures shall 
have effect and influence over the society similar to the effect and 
influence of disseminating of the wrong and offensive information. 
Only thus, the moral pain caused to the person can be compensat-
ed. moreover it is logical that  one or another mass media was re-
sponsible for dissemination of the wrong and offensive information 
and in no case this should be deemed as restriction of the freedom 
of speech according to the accepted practice, dissemination of the 
false facts does not take place within the scopes of protection of 
freedom of thought. The Constitutional Court makes reference to the 
practice of German Federal Constitutional Court, according to which 
wrong information as such is not subject to protection at all. The 
“statements intentionally containing wrong facts and the undoubtedly 
false statements” are beyond the scopes of protection. Protection 
of the expression of views is protected only as the means for the 
battle of minds (Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No: 
2/1/241, 2004).
Conclusion
Thus, it is actually impossible to draw clear distinction between the 
freedom of expression and obligation of protection of honor, dignity 
and business reputation. Freedom of expression is similarly nec-
essary for the democratic society as recognition of human dignity 
and hence protection of the honor and business reputation is. It 
is clear that all mentioned rights, as the most significant values of 
the democratic society belong to the category of fundamental rights 
and are subject to protection. Furthermore, mentioned rights are 
interpreted generously and purposively along the Constitution of 
Georgia, other special legislation on this field and in conjunction 
with an internationally recognition values of human rights. 
The importance of freedom of expression in freedom of speech 
allows people to voice their morals and independence as well as 
their political views. This also includes freedom of the press and 
other media to receive or impart information or ideas. Moreover, 
the right to free expression would be meaningless if it only pro-
tected certain types of expression, so that, the right protects both 
popular and unpopular expression, including speech that might 
shock others. However, freedom of expression is not absolute and 
can be limited when it conflicts with other rights. One of the excep-
tions is when it conflicts with the rights or reputations of others. At 
the same time, none of discussed rights has any preference over 
the other, unless the basis of specific restriction is established for 
protection of the others’ rights and dignity and hence, against the 
freedom of expression. Judicial practice discussed above shows 
that the precondition and scopes of intervention into the freedom 
of expression depends on each specific case, regarding whose 
rights were affected, against freedom of expression and to what 
extent. Proportionality must however follow the limitation with due 
regard to the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of 
the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose and less restrictive means 
to achieve the purpose.
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